What’s sacrosanct about “42 Squadrons”? Or, is it a Cover for Importing More Foreign Fighter Aircraft?

[IAF Chief, ACM AP Singh, taking COAS, Gen. Upendra Dwivedi, up for a Tejas spin]

The 42-squadron strength the IAF has flogged as its desired combat fleet size was originally spun out of the 50 squadron fleet recommended by the Committee chaired by JRD Tata in the wake of the 1962 War — fully 63 years ago, when ordnance was delivered by manned bombers. The 50 became 35 for want of resources before getting jacked up to 42 in the 1980s.

A 2-front wartime deployment plus reserve in the context of the PLAAF and PAF may have been the basis for settling on the 42 number. In reality though, it is just a number that’s gone up and down and up again — a function of the country’s finances, where it has been stuck for the last 35-odd years. But it is treated by the IAF as some kind of divine revelation, not to be trifled with. So, everytime any Chief of the Air Staff opens his mouth, it is to complain, issue dire warnings, about the “capability gap” attributed to the strength of the combat aircraft fleet declining to 30 squadrons, what with the phasing out of all MiG-21s from service by this year end, and the other fast obsolescing aircraft — Jaguars, Mirage 2000s and MiG-29s, that will need, the IAF brass claim, replacing inside of a decade, etc. The all-purpose panacea? 42 squadrons!

Sure enough, the recently elevated Air Chief Marshal AP Singh mouthed the same words. With print and television media faithfully relaying the CAS’ concerns and the talking heads on TV screens and press commentators echoing this oft-repeated nonsense — and this view, as intended, as always got a multiplier boost. The IAF has been very effective in getting what it wants by repeating this “procurement” spiel over the years, and pressuring the government into making ill-advised buys.

It led to the deal for 36 4.5 generation Rafales that Prime Minister Narendra Modi signed for during his April 2015 trip to France despite the by then deposed defence minister Manohar Parrikar’s well known doubts about this aircraft owing to the escalating unit cost, up from Rs 526 crores negotiated during the UPA government’s time, according to the Congress party, to Rs 1,670 crores, or over three-fold increase.

Further, the 36 Rafales in the Indian air orbat have nowhere met the the 70%-75% availability standard agreed on vide the Inter-Governmental Agreement of 23 September 2016, or 27 of the 36 Rafales being available at all times. This standard was demanded of Dassault because the frontline Su-30 MKI has serviceability rates of 55%-60% — the reason why Parrikar, by far the best defence minister the republic has ever had, suggested indigenously producing the Su-30MKI to meet IAF’s needs, and as the only imported component in the future fleet, with the Tejas (1A, 2, AMCA) as the bulk force aircraft. No wonder Parrikar was a bane, and pain in the you know what, for the IAF!

Whatever the Rafale deal has not done for India and the IAF, it did for the French aerospace industry — rescued it from insolvency. I had warned then — read my posts 2012 onwards! — that the initial 36 aircraft would be the wedge for additional 114 Rafales to fill IAF’s requirement of medium role fighter aircraft (MRFA). And also for the 26 Rafale Marine to equip the Indian aircraft carriers. The pitch for the naval version revolved around the commonality of spares and service support with the IAF Rafales. The flyoff of sorts then is pro forma, because now the IAF will argue it already has the servicing infrastructure for Rafale aircraft, and the Service would like very much to be less diversified to ease the logistics nightmare it has all along nursed!

In the event, there will be a “competition” for the MRFA deal — featuring versions of some of the same aircraft that have been in the running in the last 30 years — Lockheed F-21 — a differently designated F-16 Super Viper configuration, the Swedish Gripen, Russian MiG-35/57, and the Boeing Super Hornet F-18, that will be staged mostly for show. Unless…

Unless, the Modi government — like the preceding Congress and BJP regimes, again bends to Washington’s will. Except, Trump now will impose his terms, arm-twist Modi as he did on the tariffs issue getting New Delhi scrambling to accommodate. The question is which aircraft choice will he impose? Who knows why he publicly pushed Modi on the F-35 Lightning. May be he has bought stock in Lockheed! No US President has been so brazen in profiting from his office — it is almost refreshing! But he could go, equally, with the Viper or the Hornet. Whatever, India stands to be struck by Lightning or stung by the Viper/Hornet, and guess what gets hurt? Yep, the indigenous Tejas Mk 1A, Mk 2, and the advanced medium combat aircraft. The country cannot afford to buy yet another lot of foreign aircraft and, at the same time, develop and fly the Indian-designed, home-made Tejas family of fighter aircraft that could be the backbone of the country’s defence industry into the future. It can have one or the other.

Oh, yes, we have all heard IAF Chiefs crying crocodile tears over Tejas and how it is so dear to the service’s heart, how much it is committed to it, etc, etc. But, how, only for the nonce, the option of buying an imported combat aircraft off the shelf and assembling the balance of the requirement in India — preferably by private sector companies, will strenghten the Indian defence industry that, regretfully, cannot be avoided! It is a practised line that has been dutifully voiced by all CASs after PC Lal in the early 1970s. It was Lal who offered this explanation for choosing to kill off the advanced successor — the HF-71/72 to the HF-24 Marut, just so he could buy the British Jaguar. The Marut was created by the legendary World War Two Focke-Wulfe designer of the main Luftwaffe fighter FW109, Dr. Kurt Tank. The HF-71/72 was the product of the uber-talented Dr. Raj Mahindra, who resigned from HAL after IAF chose Jaguar, and with him into oblivion went the last purely Indian designed combat aircraft until the Tejas. The irony was IAF pilots flying the Jaguar vouched for the HF-24 as the better, more stable, low level strike aircraft!

That tragedy is endlessly repeated by the institutionalised shortsightedness of the IAF. The current chief, AP Singh, the former chief test pilot in the Tejas programme, and his successors, may end up doing to the Tejas 1A, 2, AMCA what Lal did to the HF-71, except it will be death by a thousand cuts. Meanwhile, the usual kind of defence minister — a military-wise illiterate, will read from whatever script is given him, and from one end of his mouth praise Tejas and, from the other end of his mouth, talk of meeting the “urgent” need of the IAF with imports. Jai Ho, Atm Nirbhar Bharat!!